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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
INSURANCE - AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE - "DRIVE
OTHER CARS" CLAUSE - EXCLUSION PROVISION
Defendant and the liability insurer of defendant's truck were
sued under the following "Drive Other Cars" provision: "....
Such insurance as is afforded by this policy . . . applies with
respect to any other automobile subject to the following provi-
sions: . . . (b) This insuring agreement does not apply: (1) to
any automobile owned by, hired as part of a frequent use of
hired automobiles by, or furnished for regular use to the named
insured or a member of his household." Plaintiff, a guest pas-
senger, was injured in an accident which occurred while de-
fendant was driving his father's car. At the time of the acci-
dent defendant lived with his parents and contributed to the
household expenses, but not in fixed or definite sums. The in-
surer of the father's car paid plaintiff the face value of its policy,
but the insurer of defendant's truck refused payment, contend-
ing that the father's car was "owned by a member of defendant's
household." Plaintiff contended that the inaccurate punctuation
of the exclusionary provision rendered it ambiguous, and also
that the words, "his household," in the exclusionary provision
were ambiguous, thus necessitating the interpretation of the pro-
vision in favor of the insured. The trial court found the exclu-
sionary provision to be ambiguous and gave judgment for plain-
tiff. On appeal, held, judgment against defendant insurer re-
versed.1 The exclusionary provision was not ambiguous simply
because it required a careful and close reading. Leteff v. Mary-
land Casualty Co., 91 So.2d 123 (La. App. 1956).
Originally, because an automobile owner drove only his own
car and very few other persons knew how to operate it, the basic
automobile policy covered only the owner when he drove that car.2
After automobiles became more commonplace, statutory enact-
ments made the owner of an automobile legally responsible even
though another was using his car, and the basic policy was ex-
panded so that not only the owner but any other person using
the owner's car with his permission was covered. In 1941, it
was generally felt that it would be desirable to afford coverage
that would follow and protect the insured, and as a result the
1. Judgment against defendant, rendered by the trial court in the amount of
$60,000.00, allowed to stand. Leteff v. Maryland Cas. Co., 91 So.2d 123 (La.
App. 1956).
2. Thornbury, Coverage v. Use of Other Automobiles of the Standard Auto-
mobile Combination Policies, 17 INSURANCE COUNSEL J. 383, 390 (1950).
3. Ibid.
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"Drive Other Cars" clause with its exclusionary provision was
adopted. 4  Although the early "Drive Other Cars" clauses dif-
fered slightly in form, 5 the first decisions interpreting these
clauses recognized that their common purpose was to provide
protection to the insured when he was engaged in the casual use
of automobiles other than the one described in the policy. 6 The
exclusionary provision within the clause was inserted in order
to protect the insurer from a situation in which a family might
have two or more cars interchangeably used, but only one auto-
mobile insured.7 The term "household" appeared in these early
provisions and was generally accepted as synonymous with the
dictionary definition of the word "family." Mere presence un-
der the same roof did not necessarily render all the occupants
members of the same "household." 9  In the construction of a
rider provision similar to these early exclusionary provisions,
it was held that, although a member of the family may, not be
the head of the household, it is, nevertheless, his household, i.e.,
every member of the family has a household although he may
not be its head.10 In dealing with contracts of insurance, defi-
nitions of "household" as an abstract term had to give way to the
practical considerations of what the parties to the contract in-
tended, in the light of the purpose of the provision.1 '
The purpose of the present "Drive Other Cars" clause has
4. Ibid.
5. For an incomplete, but representative group of these various provisions, see
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pulsifer, 41 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Me. 1941) ; Island
v. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.2d 541, 184 P.2d 153 (1947) ; Rodenkirk
v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 421, 60 N.E.2d 269 (1945)
Fleming v. Travelers Ins. Co., 206 Miss. 284, 39 So.2d 885 (1949).
6. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pulsifer, 41 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Me. 1941)
Rodenkirk v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 421, 60 N.E.2d
269 (1945). See also Thornbury, Coverage v. Use of Other Automobiles of the
Standard Automobile Combination Policies, 17 INSURANCE COUNSEL J. 383, 390
(1950).
7. See note 6 supra.
8. Island v. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.2d 541, 184 P.2d 153
(1947), and cases cited therein.
9. See Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pulsifer, 41 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Me.
1941), where the court said that where families of father and son were under the
father's roof temporarily, there was not one "household" within the meaning of
the exclusionary provision. See also Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins.
Co., 32 So.2d 52 (La. App. 1947), where in dictum the court said that the mere
living together of the parties involved under the circumstances did not make them
members of the same household.
10. Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Violano, 123 F.2d 692, 695
(2d Cir. 1941). See also Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 239 Minn. 250, 58
N.W.2d 855 (1953).
11. Fleming v. Travelers Ins. Co., 206 Miss. 284, 39 So.2d 885, 887 (1949):
"'Household' cannot be satisfactorily defined as an abstract term. Definition by
lexicon supplies elements which are seized upon by opposing interests and isolated
from other factors [to] furnish material relevant to contradictory conclusions."
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been held to be the same as that of its predecessors. 12  Because
of its punctuation, the present exclusionary provision has been
attacked, though infrequently, on the ground of ambiguity.18 In
the leading decision dealing with the present provision it was
stated that the punctuation did not render the provision am-
biguous, but because of a condensation of the phraseology for
brevity, the provision did require careful and close reading.14
Although a subsequent case held the punctuation rendered the
"Drive Other Cars" clause ambiguous,1 5 a more recent decision
interpreting the clause has disregarded this case and reaffirmed
the position that the punctuation does not render the clause am-
biguous.16 Before the instant case, the term "household" in
the present exclusionary provision had apparently never been
interpreted by an appellate court in any jurisdiction.
This is the first Louisiana case dealing with the interpreta-
tion of the "Drive Other Cars" clause. Since defendant was
driving his father's car, the court was faced with the problem of
whether the exclusionary provision would apply only to those
automobiles, "owned by, hired as part of a frequent use of hired
automobiles by, or furnished for regular use to" members of a
household of which defendant was the head. If such was the
intention, it would seem that more restrictive and specific lan-
guage would be necessary in the provision itself.'7  By not sub-
scribing to such a restricted interpretation, the court, in keeping
with the jurisprudence, gave the words of the insurance con-
tract the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning usually attached
12. "The purpose of the clause is to cover casual or occasional use of other
cars. Any other interpretation would subject the insurance company to greatly
added risk without the payment of additional premiums." Vern v. Merchants Mut.
Cas. Co., 118 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (Sup. Ct. 1952). See also Aler v. Travelers In-
demnity Co., 92 F. Supp. 620, 623 (D. Md. 1950).
13. Campbell v. Aetna Cas. and Surety Co., 211 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1954)
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Pray, 204 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Aler v. Travelers
Indemnity Co., 92 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1950).
14. Aler v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 92 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1950).
15. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Pray, 204 F.2d 821, 824 (6th Cir. 1953)
"In order to make a complete sentence of the questioned provision, grammatical
construction would seem to require that the three phrases (1) 'to any automo-
bile owned by,' (2) 'hired as a part of a frequent use of hired automobiles by,'
and (3) 'or furnished for regular use to,' have as their object the words 'the
named insured or a member of his household' etc. Without inserting a comma
(which is not to be found in the policy) before the words 'the named insured,'
the provision cannot be so construed; for unless the comma be inserted as specified,
the first two of the three aforementioned phrases are left dangling without an
object."
16. See Campbell v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 211 F.2d 732 (4th Cir.
1954).
17. Cartier v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 84 N.H. 526, 153 Atl. 6 (1931).
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to them.18 In dealing with the punctuation of the exclusionary
provision the court was squarely faced with conflicting expert
testimony. However, by accepting the opinion that the three
phrases of the provision were equal members of a series, each
taking the same object, the court applied a well-known rule of
English grammar, 19 and the only case which held to the contrary
was disregarded. 20  The court's interpretation of the "Drive
Other Cars" clause is in accord with the apparent purpose of such
a clause; for though the clause was intended to extend some
coverage to an insured when driving another automobile, it is
questionable that the insurer desired to allow the insured, be-
cause of the intimacy of his family, to drive automobiles always
available to him and still be covered. 21
In October of 1956, the Louisiana State Insurance Commis-
sion approved a new policy known as the Family Combination
Automobile Policy. The older Standard Automobile Combina-
tion Policy may now be converted to this new policy in accord-
ance with certain regulations of the commission. Although the
new Family Combination Automobile Policy contains no "Drive
Other Cars" clause, it provides the same type of coverage. 22
Though the new policy probably extends broader coverage than
the old one in some areas, the same result would have been
reached had the instant case arisen under it.2s Thus, by a dele-
tion of possible misleading words, the insurance companies have
achieved a clearer statement of the accepted purpose of the older
policies' "Drive Other Cars" clause.
H. 0. Lestage, III
OBLIGATIONS - QUANTUM MERUIT
Plaintiff, the owner of two adjoining buildings, authorized
defendant, lessee of one building, to store goods temporarily in
18. Seguin v. Continental Service Life & Health Ins. Co., 230 La. 533, 89
So.2d 113 (1956); McKinney v. American Security Life Ins. Co., 76 So.2d 630(La. App. 1954); Beard v. Peoples Industrial Life Ins. Co., 5 So.2d 340 (La.
App. 1941).
19. FORESTER & STEADMAN, WRITING AND THINKING 170, Rule 18c (1941 ed.);
HODGES, HARBRACE COLLEGE HANDBOOK 129, Rule 13d.
20. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Pray, 204 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1953).
21. Fleming v. Travelers Ins. Co., 206 Miss. 284, 39 So.2d 885 (1949).
22. This coverage is provided by the "Persons Insured" clause in light of the
definition of the terms "non-owned automobile" and "relative."
23. In the new policy a "non-owned automobile" is defined as one not owned
by the named insured or any relative. "Relative" is defined in the policy as a
relative who is a resident of the same household. Thus, since the car in the instant
case was owned by a relative of the named insured within the definitions of the
new policy, the automobile could not be considered a "non-owned automobile" and
the named insured would not have been covered while driving it.
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